BB IW logic (or T → ) is known to be D-complete. This paper shows that there are infinitely many weaker D-complete logics and it also examines how certain D-incomplete logics can be made complete by altering their axioms using simple substitutions.
Introduction
The condensed detachment rule, first proposed by C. A. Meredith in Lemmon et al [5] , is a form of modus ponens preceded by 'just enough' substitution to make the modus ponens possible. The substitution mechanism, for implicational formulas, was a precursor to Robinson's unification algorithm [8] .
Roughly, a system of implicational logic is D-complete if the system with the same axioms, but with condensed detachment (D) instead of modus ponens and substitution, has the same theorems.
To show that a logic is D-complete it is sufficient to show that all the substitution instances of its axioms are deducible in the corresponding condensed logic (i.e. the logic with rule D only).
It is well known that every logic with axioms only from the list:
(See Hindley and Meredith [3] and Kalman [4] .) Meyer and Bunder [6] showed that the system based on (B), (B ), (I) and
which we will call BB IW logic (or T → ), is D-complete. (See also [2] and [7] ).
Here we show that D-completeness can be shown for a weaker logic, which we will call M . This is based on (I) and the following:
We show that there is an even weaker interesting D-complete logic as well as an infinite sequence of independent D-complete logics. We also comment on the relation between (A1), (A2) and (A3) and the more standard axioms such as (B), (B ), (I) and (W).
Condensed detachment
The formulation we give here for condensed detachment is equivalent to the more standard one of, for example, Hindley and Meredith [3] but is simpler to state (see [1] ).
In all the work below, if P is a formula of logic, σ i (P ) will represent the result of a simultaneous substitution of formulas for propositional variables in P .
(Rule D). From P → Q and R conclude σ 1 (Q), where there are substitutions σ 1 and σ 2 such that
(2) Given (1) the number of occurrences of propositional variables in σ 1 (Q) is minimal. (3) Given (1) and (2), the number of distinct propositional variables in σ 1 (Q) is maximal.
Note 1. There may be no such σ 1 and σ 2 , for example for (a → a) → a → a and a → b → a, so the above rule does not always reach a conclusion.
Note 2. When we can obtain σ 1 (Q) from P → Q and R, we will say that we detach R from P → Q to give σ 1 (Q).
We should also note that the axioms with names (I), (B) etc. are the principal types of the combinators I, B, etc. If a combinator X has principal type P → Q and Y has principal type R then XY , if it has a type, has principal type σ 1 (Q) obtained by D. Thus XY can designate the proof of σ 1 (Q).
3 The D-completeness of M The notation M P or just P will represent "P is a theorem of M ."
Before proving our result we require 6 lemmas.
Proof. Detach (I) from (A3) to obtain:
Detaching (I) from this gives the result.
Proof. Detach (I) from lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.3
If a formula P has no repeated propositional variables then
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Proof. By induction on the length of P . If P is atomic, use (I). If P is Q → R, where we have proved
Detach lemma 3.2 from this to obtain
Detaching R → R from this gives
Note that if Q and R had a variable in common, condensed detachment would have, at this last step, changed all occurrences of this common variable in Q to a distinct new variable. Lemma 3.4 If a formula P has no repeated propositional variables and d is a propositional variable in P , then
Proof. By induction on the length of P . If P is atomic, use lemma 3.2.
If P is Q → R, we have that d is in Q or R but not both.
Case 2: d is in R. By the induction hypothesis
Suppose P is a formula with propositional variables a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n each of which appears exactly once in P . For 1 ≤ i j ≤ n let
Proof. By definition a i appears twice in Q. Let R → S be the largest part of Q where a i appears in R and in S.
As a i appears once in R and once in S, we have by lemma 3.4
and detaching these from (A3) gives
Detaching (I) gives (R → S) → R → S.
Note now that in the induction step of lemma 3.3 we did not use the fact that neither Q nor R there had repeated propositional variables, thus we can use the same technique to obtain
until Q → Q is built up.
Lemma 3.6
For any formula P , P → P .
Proof. Let the variables of P be a 1 , . . . , a n , where each a i occurs k i times. Let Q be P , where for each i, the jth occurrence of a i is replaced by a ij . All the variables of Q are therefore distinct. Now let
We prove, by induction on k, P k → P k . The k = 1 case is by lemma 3.5. Now assume P k → P k and detach this from lemma 3.1 to obtain
Detach Q k+1 → Q k+1 from this to obtain
Note that the pair of identical variables in Q k+1 causes the corresponding pair of distinct variables in P k to become identical in P k+1 .
Thus we have P m → P m i.e. P → P . Theorem 3.7 If P is a substitution instance of Q and Q then P .
Proof. By lemma 3.6, P → P . Detaching Q from this gives the result. Proof. All the uses of (A1) and (A2) in the work above can be performed by (A3) and (K) instead. We give one example of this:
Other D-complete logics
In the proof of lemma 3.3 we have Q → Q, so by (K) we have
Detaching this from (A3) gives the result obtained previously by detaching Q → Q from (A1).
Theorem 4.2
The logic whose axioms are (I) as well as
is D-complete as is the equivalent logic having (I), (B), (B ) and (AA3).
Proof. It can easily be checked that the above lemmas and theorem 3.7 can be proved by the above alternatives and (I), so the logic of these is D-complete.
(AA1) can be derived from (B) and (B ) (proof: BB(B(B B)(BBB ))). (B) can also be derived from (AA1) by detaching (I) twice.
(AA2) can be derived from (B) and (B ) (proof: B(B (BB ))(BB(BBB))). (B ) can also be derived from (AA2) by detaching (I) twice.
To derive (AA3) from (B) and (B ) we require at least one axiom that has at least one propositional variable appear more than twice, such as any of (W),
Proofs are:
B(BW){B(B [B(BB)(BB)])[BB(BB (BB ))]}, B(B (BB))(BS(B(BB )(BB ))) and B(B (B(BB)(BB)))(BS (BB )).
Thus:
The logics with axioms (B), (B ), (I) and one of (S), (S ) or (W) are D-complete.
Logics such as these look simpler than M however they are stronger.
Theorem 4.4
The logic M is strictly weaker than BB IS, BB IW, BB IS or BB I(AA3) logic.
Proof. Theorem 4.2 and the discussion below it showed that BB I(AA3) is a subsystem of each of BB IS, BB IS and BB IW.
The axioms of M are substitution instances of (I), (AA1), (AA2) and (AA3), so by theorem 4.2, M is a subsystem of, or is, BB I(AA3).
It is easy to show, by induction on the length of proof, that all theorems of M are of the form
for some n ≥ 0. Thus (B) and (B ) cannot be derived so M is weaker than the 4 logics above.
Theorem 4.5
The logic with (B), (B ), (I) and
Proof. The proof B[B {B(BB)(BB)}][BB(BB (BB ))] gives (AA3 )
using which the lemmas and theorem 3.7 can be proved as with (A3).
As (AA3 ), and so (AA3 ), is a BB I theorem, it follows that BB I and BB I(AA3 ) are equivalent logics. In theorems of condensed BB I (or BCI) logic propositional variables must appear exactly twice each, thus (AA3 ) is not provable in condensed BB I logic. It therefore follows that condensed versions of equivalent logics may be inequivalent.
M is not the weakest D-complete logic, this we show below.
Theorem 4.6
The logic M * with (I) and
is D-complete and strictly weaker than M .
Proof. All the lemmas prior to it and theorem 3.7 can be proved as before.
As M is D-complete and (A1) * , (A2) * and (A3) * are substitution instances of (A1), (A2) and (A3) respectively, they are theorems of M .
It can easily be shown that all theorems of M * have the property that all propositional variables occur an even number of times in any theorem. This does not hold for (A3), so (A3) is not a theorem of M * . Thus M * is strictly weaker than M .
An infinite set of independent D-complete logics can be obtained by considering systems M n with as axioms (I), (A1), (A2) and
The systems M n are mutually independent and weaker than BB IW.
Proof. We first show that (A3m) is not derivable in M n where n ≥ 3 and m n. Consider the matrix
where 0 is the only designated value. Clearly any formula of the form P → P (including (I)) has value 0. Thus (A1) and (A2) can be evaluated as
The n-valued matrix for → validates all theorems of M n if n 2 but not all of those of M m if m n.
We now show that (A3m) is not derivable in M n where m n ≥ 2. Consider the matrix with designated value 0.
(A1) and (A2) can be evaluated as before and (A3m) as (A1) and (A2) can be evaluated as before and (A3m) as
Thus all theorems of M n are validated for n ≥ 1 but not all of M m for m n. Finally, all the theorems of M 2 are BB I theorems and (A3)(=A31), a theorem of M 1 , is not.
We therefore have that each system M n has a theorem not provable in M m if m = n, so all the systems are independent.
We show that each system M n is no stronger than BB IW by stating a proof in BB IW of a formula of which (A3n) is a substitution instance. The D-completeness of BB IW means that (A3n) is also derivable (by methods such as the ones in this paper). The proof for n 2 is:
where
The fact that M n for n 2 is strictly weaker than BB IW follows as in the proof of theorem 4.4. As all the axioms of M 2 are BB I theorems, M 2 is strictly weaker than BB IW. This result for M 1 appears in theorem 4.4.
'Completing' by substitution
The logic I(AA1)(AA2)(AA3 ) is equivalent to BB I logic; neither is D-complete. However, as was shown in the proof of theorem 4.5, one simple (variable for variable) substitution in (AA3 ) (giving (AA3 )) converts the logic into a D-complete one. To convert BB I logic into a D-complete logic, a single more complex substitution instance of (B) must be added to (B), (B ) and (I). This allows the proof of (AA3 ) in the proof of theorem 4.5 to be converted into the proof of the other BB I theorem quoted there.
However, we prove below that I logic requires an infinite number of substitution instances of its axiom to convert it into a D-complete logic and conjecture that the same is true for the logics B, B , BB , BI and B I.
We now look at theorems that can be generated using Rule D from substitution instances of Axiom (I). For this we need to define unification. Definition 5.1 U(P 1 , P 2 ) is the unification of P 1 and P 2 . This is the shortest formula σ 1 (P 1 ) such that for some σ 2 , σ 1 (P 1 ) = σ 2 (P 2 ) and of those one whose number of distinct propositional variables is maximal.
In other words U(P 1 , P 2 ) = σ 1 (P 1 ) the result of detaching P 2 from P 1 → P 1 . We define U(P 1 , . . . , P n ) = U(U(P 1 , . . . , P n−1 ), P n ).
We note that
Lemma 5.2
If Q → Q is derived using only Rule D from P 1 → P 1 , . . . , P n → P n as axioms then each subterm of Q → Q is of the form U(R 1 , . . . , R k ) where R 1 , . . . , R k are (sub)terms of P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n .
Proof. The result clearly holds for any axiom (with U(
and the result holds by the induction hypothesis, and
S).
By the induction hypothesis
. . , R j , R p , . . . , R q ) as required.
Lemma 5.3
The number of elements generated by unification from P 1 , . . . , P n , #UE(P 1 , . . . , P n ) ≤ 2 n − 1.
Proof. The number of unifications U(P i , P j ) for i = j is clearly at most n(n − 1)/2. The number of unifications, for i, j, k different, U(U(P i , P j ), P k ) = U(U(P i , P j ), U(P i , P k )) = U(U(P i , P j ), U(P j , P k )) = U(U(P k , P i ), U(P j , P k ))
is at the most n(n − 1)(n − 2)/(1 · 2 · 3). So #UE(P 1 , . . . , P n ) ≤ n + n(n − 1) 1 · 2 + n(n − 1)(n − 2) 1 · 2 · 3 + · · · + n(n − 1) 1 · 2 + n + 1
Only a finite number of theorems can be derived using Rule D only from axioms of the form P 1 → P 1 , . . . , P n → P n .
Proof. By lemma 5.2 any theorem derived from such axioms using Rule D is of the form Q → Q where Q is a unification of (sub)terms of P 1 , . . . , P n . The number of such (sub)terms is finite so by lemma 5.3 the number of terms Q that can be generated by unification is also finite. Theorem 5.5
To transform condensed I-logic into I-logic an infinite number of substitution instances of the axiom a → a are required.
Proof. By theorem 5.4.
Note that there are also logics where substitution instances of their axioms give no new theorems other than those axioms themselves. An example is the logic with the axiom (a → a) → (a → a) → a → a.
